United States Fire Administration

Technical Report Series

Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse Fire
Dayton, Ohio

With Supplement on
Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire
Basel, Switzerland

Federal Emergency Management Agency

United States Fire Administration
National Fire Data Center
Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse Fire
Dayton, Ohio
(May 27, 1987)

With Supplement on
Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire
Basel, Switzerland

Investigated by: Tom D. Copeland
Philip Schaeenman

This is Report 009 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
## SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Spark from lift truck ignited spilled contents of cans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Firefighting</td>
<td>Ineffective; could not stop initial fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprinkler Systems-</td>
<td>Overwhelmed in warehouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helped save office building adjoining warehouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question whether standard is adequate for this occupancy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Wall</td>
<td>Failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Command</td>
<td>Highly effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quick, appropriate decision by first arriving district chief not to let crews in close.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Courageous decision by Chief Glenn Alexander not to vigorously attack fire with water precluded environmental disaster to aquifer and city water supply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>To be paid despite decision not extinguish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Liability</td>
<td>None apparent in this case but cannot generalize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-fire Plan</td>
<td>Did not address threat to aquifer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Pollution</td>
<td>Apparently little to none.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tradeoff of air versus water pollution considered early, unlike Swiss Sandoz fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air and water experts on the scene early.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefighter Safety</td>
<td>A major factor in decision not to fight in close.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only one firefighter slightly injured in four-day fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Safety</td>
<td>Difficulty in accounting for employees who escaped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only one employee seriously injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OVERVIEW

The Dayton, Ohio Fire Department avoided a double disaster by not attempting to extinguish a massive fire in a paint warehouse. The fire started on May 27, 1987, and completely destroyed the Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse. The dollar loss was $32 million, but only one employee was seriously injured and one fire fighter sprained his leg. The noncombustible, sprinklered warehouse contained over 1.5 million gallons of paints and other products and was located over the aquifer from which wells provided the water supply for about one-third of the area's 400,000 people. Uncontained water and chemical run-off from firefighting could have contaminated this water supply and caused a greater loss than the fire itself, as occurred in Switzerland after the Sandoz chemical warehouse fire in 1986 contaminated the Rhine.

THE FACILITY

The Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse was a large one-story building with an attached office building. An adjoining roofed-over area was used for drum storage. Trailers, some loaded, were located at the docks and within the fenced-in area of the facility. Direct exposure to properties outside the storage complex was minimal. (For a diagram of the site see Figure 1 in Appendix B.)
The main building's outside walls were of "tilt-up" concrete construction with a fire division wall of similar construction dividing the warehouse into two areas. The roof was supported by unprotected steel bar joists and columns. The facility was built in 1977 and contained about 190,000 sq. ft. with walls about 33 ft. high.

The building had a sprinkler system and diesel fire pump; The 2,500 gpm fire pump was located in a small detached building. Fire department connections to supplement the system were located on the warehouse side of the pumphouse.

The pump was supplied by a 12" line connected to a 16" public water main. The pump supplied a 10" loop around the site with connections to various sprinkler risers, external exposure sprinklers along the outside wall at the drum storage, fixed monitors for the drum storage area, and private hydrants. Water flow alarms were monitored by a central station. The ceiling sprinklers had a reported design density of 0.32 gpm per sq. ft. over 4,000 sq. ft.

The warehouse contained over 1.5 million gallons of paints and related flammable liquids mostly in small containers up to 5 gallon sizes. There was also considerable storage of aerosol cans. Drums were stored outside under the canopy area. Trailers contained additional products. The warehouse had extensive rack type storage, up to four tiers of pallets high. Approximately 30 employees were working at the time of the fire.

THE WATER SYSTEM

The public water supply for Dayton, Ohio and surrounding areas is drawn partly from an aquifer over which the Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse was built. The warehouse was within a major well field with wells on and adjacent to the site. (See Appendix D for map of wells.)
Chemicals can migrate down from the surface and contaminate the water. This was a concern when the industrial park where the warehouse was located was first developed. No detailed plans had been made by the fire department to deal with a threat to the water supply, although the threat was anticipated and discussed several years before the fire.

THE FIRE

During the evening of May 27, 1987, a workman using a motorized lift truck accidentally knocked over and spilled several cans of flammable liquid in the east portion of the warehouse. The liquid probably was ignited by a spark from the electric motor of the truck. The lift truck operator received serious burns and was helped by other employees to put out his flames and escape. The employees quickly decided that the fire was beyond their ability to extinguish, and all evacuated without further injuries. They credited company training for knowing what to do.

The Dayton Fire Department received the alarm automatically from the fire alarm central station when the plant’s sprinklers activated, along with many calls from the public and employees. Three engines, one truck, and a district chief were dispatched at 2107. While responding, the district chief quickly decided to request a second alarm at 2108. This resulted in four additional engines, two additional trucks, and another district chief. The first engine on the scene reported complete building involvement at 2113. The first-in district chief requested a third alarm as he arrived on the scene at 2114.

A total of 84 Fire Department personnel responded with ten engines, five trucks, and twelve other vehicles. Most of the equipment was staged and not actually used.

The fire was through the roof, and the east half of the warehouse was totally involved when the first units arrived. Aerosol cans were raining on the crews and hurtling for distances. The initial concerns were for protecting the drum storage, office, and other exposures, and for fire fighter safety. The district chief quickly decided not to let his fire
fighters hook up to the sprinkler supply of the pumphouse, which was close to the wall of the warehouse and exposed to intense heat, danger from exploding and the hurtling cans, and the threat of a wall collapse. Also, it was thought that the sprinkler system was probably compromised already. The initial attack was directed at the office, drum storage, and loaded trailers in the docking and parking areas.

The fire spread past the fire wall and was involving the west half of the warehouse before plans could be implemented to cut the fire off at the wall. At 2132, the dispatcher was advised that the building would be a total loss. (The fire ultimately did destroy the main warehouse, and 17 trailers also were heavily or totally damaged. The office, its records, and the outdoor drum storage were saved.)

The warehouse sprinkler system was overwhelmed almost immediately and had little impact on the main fire. Water was observed discharging from broken sprinkler piping early in the fire. Sprinklers did apparently contribute to saving the office building. The fire pump supplying the sprinklers was manually shut down at about 2235 or 2245.

Automatically-opening plastic vents almost directly over the incipient fire operated early and may have released heat that otherwise would have built up quickly and caused more sprinkler heads to go off, suggested Dayton Chief Glenn Alexander. In any event, the sprinkler system design was not adequate for controlling this fire.

Chief Alexander assumed incident command early on and ordered that no water be applied to the fire in the warehouse. Water was to be used only to protect exposures and to extinguish fires where the run off could be monitored on paved areas. Because of his concern about the water supply well field, Chief Alexander called the director of the water department prior to responding and requested the director to meet him at the scene.

The contents of the warehouse, the problem of air pollution versus water pollution, and other conditions were considered. In addition to local water authorities, state air and water pollution experts were on the scene the first day. It was agreed that it would be best not to increase
the threat to the water system by applying water to the warehouse fire. The smoke was not causing a direct life safety exposure and was described as being similar in hazard to diesel exhaust.

Douglas Hall, Environmental Protection Manager for the Dayton Water Department, said the early decision not to put water on this fire was clear cut. The decision was made easier due to the knowledge that there were no highly toxic materials present and no residential areas close-by. If it had not been for the threat to the underground water supply, they probably would have recommended applying water to the fire and controlling runoff. Although the fire department avoided applying much water to the warehouse itself, the sprinkler system 2,500 gpm fire pump did operate for a while and there also was runoff from the initial attack. Thus some contaminated water reached the nearby Miami River. On day one of the fire, paint solvents were skimmed and pumped from the river. A water containment dike was, started on the fourth day of the fire in preparation for the final extinguishment operation. Since the fire, numerous test and recovery wells have been dug. There is some ground contamination, but the contamination apparently is being managed and has not yet affected the water supply.

The fire was reported contained at 0012 hours on May 28, 1987 but not under control until 1004 hours on June 2, 1987, almost six days after it started.

**CODE COMPLIANCE**

The warehouse was in compliance with the Ohio Building Code, as best could be determined. That code allowed unlimited space in the warehouse so long as it was fully sprinklered. No performance standards or guidelines are provided in the code as to what constitutes adequate sprinklering for such a facility.

There is some question as to what would be the most cost-effective fire protection design that would comply with the code for a warehouse such as this, full of highly flammable liquids.
One alternative is to subdivide the building into many compartments, each with a high flow sprinkler system -- practically like preparing to flood a magazine compartment on a ship. Another is to build large open spaces with few fire walls, lower flow sprinkler system that may handle some fires (such as cardboard cartons igniting or a small spill) but not one such as occurred. A third approach -- not in compliance with most codes -- build a lightweight, "disposable" building or shed (such as was involved in the Swiss Sandoz chemical warehouse fire discussed in the supplement) but built in a safe, remote environment (unlike the Sandoz fire) where it could be allowed to burn. Containment ponds and dams can be built-in to catch water runoff if water pollution could be a problem. Further fire protection studies are needed to examine the various other options for such warehouses.

LIABILITY

Was the fire department exposed to liability suits by deciding not to extinguish the fire? Do insurance companies have to pay insurance in these cases? In this case, the answers were largely moot because the building was judged to be on its way to becoming a total loss when the decision was made, and the insurance company tentatively agreed to pay the loss without protest. Here is a synopsis of the liability situation, but this is no substitute for seeking legal advice for your own area.

1. The fire department has very broad rights to take action in an emergency. It even can destroy property to save other property; for example, during the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, rows of buildings were dynamited to provide a fire break to stop the fire. The owners, however, can seek indemnification from the city for destroying their property. The insurance company also can sue.

2. The fire department and the city can be liable for negligence (unreasonable actions) unless state statutes limit that liability or unless the cities have "sovereign immunity." Most states no longer recognize the latter. States vary in their liability laws. Liability questions need to be answered state by state.
3. Most states have laws that limit the liability of a fire department for negligence or poor judgment. The limit may be zero as in California. In Minnesota, it is $300,000 or the limit of negligence insurance it carries, whichever is greater.

4. If a fire department decides to let a building burn that could have been saved in order to protect a greater loss to the community, they could be sued by any party -- the property owner, insurance company, public, etc. If found negligent, then 2) applies. If not, they are home free -- except for legal expenses.

5. The insurance company usually has to pay for the loss regardless of the fire department actions. Although the insurance company reasonably expects the fire department to fight a fire if their insured property burned, it is their hard luck if the fire department does not fight the fire. However, knowing this possibility exists may cause premiums to go up for properties that could cause pollution if they burn. Also, the insurance company might claim that the building owner did not reveal all hazards, and try to hold back a part or much of the insurance, or delay payment.

6. The insurance company might have to pay for environmental damage up to the limit of the policy as part of fire losses. It depends on the details of the policy and or the details of the situation.

7. This is all on the edge of a new area legally, environmentally, ethically, and from fire fighting points of view. It needs further exploration. Fire departments should discuss the issue with local city attorneys. The fire department, while it generally appears to be safe, may fall into some loophole or have an adverse interpretation of the law in light of the new circumstances.

LESSONS LEARNED

1: Risk Management -- The most important lesson learned because of this fire is not simply that some fires should be allowed to burn but that the consequences of all actions and "inactions" must be knowledgeably Considered.
Chief Alexander describes today's fire chiefs as "risk managers." This is a good application of the term and broadens a chief's role and responsibility. Risk management of such fires as this involves the consideration of:

- Characteristics of materials and chemicals involved,
- Air versus water pollution,
- Wind and weather conditions,
- Capability to extinguish or control the fire,
- Ability to contain run-off,
- Short-term versus delayed hazards,
- Life safety and property exposure, and
- Evacuation problems.

2. **Water Pollution** -- In this fire, the decision not to apply water to the warehouse fire resulted in far less contamination to the ground water and little if any difference in property loss. State and local air and water pollution experts were brought to the scene early to consult. The Swiss Sandoz chemical plant fire, which polluted the Rhine, demonstrated what can happen when water run off is not considered. (A summary of that fire is presented below.) However, it may not always be possible to allow such fires to burn when there is a high exposure hazard or an air pollution problem. Applying water to avoid a fire or air pollution catastrophe may be the lesser evil at times; it depends on the situation. Containment of water runoff should be a consideration both in pre-fire planning and in planning fire protection systems for a structure or complex which has significant amounts of hazardous materials.

3. **Insurance and Law Suits** -- According to Chief Alexander, the insurance company for the warehouse said it will not sue the Fire Department for not applying water to extinguish the warehouse fire. A key factor here was that the warehouse building was essentially a total loss at the time the decision to stop applying water was made by the Chief. If the building could have been saved, the same finding might not have been made.
The liability of the city might have been much greater if the water supply had been damaged, let alone the adverse local and national publicity that would surely have ensued. Nevertheless, fire departments that plan ahead of time to let a fire burn because of environmental considerations should one occur on a particular property need to discuss that possibility beforehand with the city attorney and the property owner as part of pre-fire planning.

4. **Sprinkler Systems** -- Two important fire safety features provided in this warehouse failed: the sprinkler system and the fire wall. Apparently, the sprinkler system was quickly overwhelmed and could not provide the necessary water density. This may have been affected by the venting system releasing heat directly above the incipient fire and stopping heat build-up that might have triggered other heads quickly. The system was considered in compliance with current standards and the Ohio codes; Chief Alexander has called for a reexamination of the standards for such high-risk occupancies.

Turning off the fire pump and then the water supply to the warehouse was a calculated risk primarily in regard to the office area. The warehouse was not being affected by the sprinkler system, but the office area had been saved to that point by several heads that operated. It was felt that the threat to the aquifer outweighed the potential loss of the office building. However, after the fire, the office building was found to have received very little damage.

5. **Fire Wall** -- The fire wall did not withstand the rapid fire build-up and intense exposure. A hole developed in it. Chief Alexander stated that the fire doors in the fire wall did close except in one case where only a door on one side of the wall closed. The opposite door was jammed by debris. The opening was protected by the door from one side. Again, standards for fire walls in such high-risk facilities need to be reexamined.

6. **Firefighter Safety** -- It was remarkable and a tribute to Dayton’s incident command and fire fighters that they sustained only one minor
injury in the course of this fire. (It was a strained leg from lifting hose.) As it should be, fire fighter safety was considered right from the early decisions not to supply the sprinkler system and to pull units well away from the walls.

7. Land Development Decision -- The threat to the aquifers would not have existed if the paint storage facility had not been allowed to be built amidst the water well field. The city had had second thoughts about allowing development on this land and had stopped the full development originally planned. Environmental impacts need to be and often are a major factor in land development decisions. Potential impacts from fires are not always considered in these studies, and fire departments should try to make sure that they are where appropriate.

8. Employee Training-- A Sherwin-Williams employee accidentally started the fire. Whether such fires can be totally prevented is debatable, and may not be economically feasible (e.g.; not allowing equipment that can produce sparks anywhere near flammable liquids should there be breakage and a spill.)

The employees were well trained to evacuate quickly and rendezvous, and to extinguish the flames on the clothes of the lift truck driver. However, the place they were to rendezvous at was being barraged by exploding cannisters, so the employees did not stay together, and a head count could not be taken to ensure all had escaped. Unnecessary time was spent tracking them down and ensuring that no one was missing. Employees should be instructed to go to a meeting place that, as far as can be determined in advance, will be safe and/or to check in after a disaster occurs.

9. Incident Reporting -- Training is needed to ensure consistent and accurate reporting of fire incidents. In this case, for example, the sprinkler systems operated, but were not so reported. With understandable intent, the fire officer filling out the report noted that the sprinkler performance was "other-not described above" because the sprinklers were overwhelmed. In analyzing this data across many fires, this clear case of sprinkler system failure would not have been counted.
10. **Incident Command** -- The fire was a near textbook example of the use of a good incident command system. Higher level chiefs smoothly took over as incident commander as the alarms built up. There were no major communications problems. The dispatchers did a good job of coping with a large number of callers who reported the fire or asked about its risk. The incident command helped hold casualties and losses down.

    * * * * *

    Because historically the objective of firefighters has been to extinguish hostile fires, it is hoped that a review of this fire will make it apparent that risk management is a higher objective and that it is necessary to make decisions that result in the lowest possible immediate and long term loss even if that means letting the fire burn.

    It is instructive to compare the results of the Sherwin-Williams fire with the 1986 fire in the Sandoz chemical plant in Basel, Switzerland, which is described in the following supplement.
Supplement

Pollution of Rhine River Due to Runoff
from Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire in Basel, Switzerland'

Thirty tons of toxic material washed into the Rhine River with water firefighters used to fight a warehouse blaze at a riverside Sandoz chemical plant and storage facility near Basel, Switzerland in the early morning hours of November 1, 1986.

By the time the chemicals, mostly pesticides, had traveled 500 miles down the winding scenic river, half a million fish were dead, several municipal water supplies were contaminated, and the Rhine's ecosystem was badly damaged with virtually all marine life and a large proportion of microorganisms wiped out.

The approximately 25-mile-long chemical slick drifted slowly downstream from the Swiss border to the North Sea. It contained about 30 tons of insecticides, herbicides, and mercury-containing pesticides, and threatened the North Sea's winter cod harvest. Environmental groups called for a boycott of Sandoz products.

In the weeks following the fire, citizen protest rallies occurred, the Swiss government as well as Sandoz Corporation received damage claims from other countries, and Switzerland had to respond to strong criticism for its handling of the emergency from France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and the Common Market Commission.

The Facility -- The warehouse where the fire started was built in 1967. It was part of a large Sandoz chemical complex in Schweizerhalle, a small community six miles east of Basel on the Rhine's left bank. The

1 The following sources were used in this supplement: Associated Press stories following the fire; a presentation by Hans Wackerlig, Fire Prevention Service, Zurich Switzerland at the NFPA Fall Meeting, Portland, Oregon, November, 1987; personal discussion between Wackerlig and Philip Schagenman, November, 1987, "The Lessons Learned From the Sandoz Fire," Hans Wackerlig, 1987.
warehouse was about 295 feet long by 82 feet wide, with an adjoining second half another 82 feet wide separated from the first by a wall down the length of the building. It had no sprinklers because the risk of a fire was considered low. The building in effect was a light shed intended to provide shelter from rain and extremes of temperature, rather than being a solid warehouse. Its height ranged from 26 feet to a peak of 39 feet.

The half of the building where the fire started was stacked with about 1250 tons of chemicals in barrels four pallets high, somewhat like the Sherwin-Williams storage. The chemicals stored were mainly flammable liquids, including pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides, some with 30,C flashpoint. Among these were phosphoric acid and organic mercury compounds. Among additional raw materials present were ferric ferrocyanide, which may have been a key factor in the ignition sequence. The other half (82 foot width) of the building had mostly harmless chemicals.

The Incident -- In response to simultaneous reports by a police highway patrol alarm and the plant night watchman at 0019 on November 1, 1986, three Sandoz plant brigade fire fighters and the chief responded to the warehouse. Flames were shooting from the roof when the fire was first noticed. Upon arrival, the chief immediately realized that he could not cope with the situation alone and called for an all-out alarm. By 0045, 200 fire fighters were in action at the scene.

The cause of the fire has not been positively determined. It might have been started by the ignition of the ferric (ferrocyanide in the warehouse) by a butane-powered machine used to shrink-package chemicals in plastic films. The ferrocyanide was being packaged earlier in the day. This chemical has the insidious property -- discovered only after the fire-of smoldering without releasing any smoke or odor, and then suddenly breaking into almost explosive burning. Ironically, the packaging of the chemicals was started by a zealous employee who wanted to tidy up the storage while this seems the likely cause, arson has not been ruled out.
Because the fire was not discovered until it was already large and being fed by a warehouse full of highly flammable chemicals, it was accepted from the start that the warehouse would be a total loss. Attention was focused on stopping exposure fires, no mean task since barrels of flammable chemicals were hurtling through the air. At first the fire fighting was defensive, but then the chief decided to try to extinguish the fire with massive amounts of water to stop the fire spread and avoid a catastrophe to the nearby city and three major chemical complexes nearby. There also was a great deal of attention given to the risk from the possibly toxic clouds of gases being generated and whether the nearby populations in Switzerland, France, and Germany would have to be evacuated.

More than 3,000 gallons of water a minute was being pumped from the Rhine to fight the fire and keep it away from neighboring warehouses and outdoor storage. The peak pumping rate reached 8,000 gpm.

A 12,000 gallon catch basin into which both water and chemicals collected began overflowing into the river. Flames rose to 200 feet above the warehouse. Steel drums of chemicals exploded like bombs in the intense heat, gas and smoke spread towards the outskirts of Basel. At 3:30 am, a hastily convened regional crisis staff declared an emergency. No evacuation was needed. The fumes were not thought to be toxic but included mercaptans, one of the most malodorous chemicals known to man, one which causes people to feel sick and fearful that they are being poisoned. Area sirens were sounded and radio announcements urged the population to close windows and stay indoors. (Many sirens were down for routine maintenance and could not be used.)

Public transport into the area was halted, and gas masks were prepared at the civil defense arsenal. Officials ended the emergency 90 minutes later when readings showed no dangerous concentrations of toxicity in the air. No one was hurt and calm returned to Basel.

But slowly the massive run-off began moving down the Rhine. The management of the Sandoz chemical plant sent telexs to all municipal water systems along the 520 miles of river between Base1 and the Dutch North Sea port of Rotterdam, urging tests on pollution levels. It listed eight toxic
chemicals, most of them used in pesticides, that may have washed into the river. A number of West German water systems were shut down and populations supplied with drinking water by tank trucks. Dutch authorities ordered services closed to keep contaminated water out of Rhine estuaries. Most of the water applied to the fire flowed off through storm drains to the Rhine. By 4:30 a.m. the fire was under control. Incredibly, however, no serious thought seems to have been given to the potential water pollution. It was not the immediate and present danger.

Aftermath -- The full extent of the ecological damage was not evident for a few days. West Germany's Parliament was told that half a million fish were killed and aquatic life had ended in large stretches of the river. Fisheries officials said new fish for breeding probably would not be introduced for several years and it might be ten years before the river recovers. Heavy metal pollutants which sank to the bottom continued to be stirred up, sending out additional waves of pollution. It was especially tragic because the fishlife had only recently returned to the Rhine after massive clean up operations in the previous years.

But the predictions were overly pessimistic: life appears to be returning to the river today, one year after the disaster caused by man.

The warehouse where the fire originated and its adjoining twin (the double width) were destroyed, but none of the others nearby nor the open air storage were destroyed. Though the Rhine was seriously polluted, it could have been a much worse, more toxic fire had it spread further to other nearby warehouses. There were no injuries, though about 150 civilians and fire fighters were given blood tests to see if they had elevated mercury levels or other problems of the blood. They are still being monitored to see if any long term effects appear, but none have so far.

Lessons Learned - The Swiss View -- There were many lessons learned from this fire. The largest and most important lesson was that water pollution has to be considered in fire fighting, along with other environmental factors. Fires may need to be allowed to burn. "Whereas fire prevention and environmental protection were previously regarded as
two completely independent fields with some slight overlap of common interest... The interface is now realized to be, much more important than had been assumed.² However, it is still thought that it was necessary to extinguish the fire to keep it from spreading.

How to contain the water runoff needs to be considered in planning fire protection, especially where toxic chemicals or things that produce toxic chemicals when burned are present.

A third major lesson was the need for greater security around warehouses. Fifty percent of warehouse fires in Switzerland are from arson, they report. Even if this fire had not been started intentionally, the potential was there. Plant security was deemed far too lax. This was especially so for a chemical industry under political attack, as was Sandoz at the time of the fire.

A fourth lesson was the need to better to label toxic substances as to fire hazard, personal hazard, and environmental hazard. A set of new symbols has been proposed for Common Market use by a working group organized to study the fires implications.

A fifth lesson was that fire prevention and built-in fire protection for chemical warehouses need to be rethought. Present planning has proven inadequate.
Appendices

A. Dayton Fire Department Photographic Slides (with master file copy at U.S. Fire Administration).

B. Photographic Slides from Investigator (with master file copy).

c. Fire Incident Report

D. Map of Wells near Sherwin-Williams Plant (with master file copy).

E. Transcripts from Fire Department Telephone, Radio, and PA.

F. Newspaper Articles with Map of Site Reprinted with permission of the Dayton Daily News and Journal Herald. (Additional articles are with the master file copy at USFA.)
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS WAREHOUSE FIRE

Description of Slides

DAYTON FIRE DEPARTMENT PHOTOGRAPHIC SLIDES

1D. View of large flame mass from west (?) side of warehouse.

2D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. View toward east with south side of building to right and west side to near left.

3D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. View to west side of warehouse.

4D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. Southwest corner of building in foreground. Note concrete tilt-up outside walls still standing at east end of south wall.

5D. View of remains after fire. Note paint cans and twisted steel columns.

6D. View of sprinkler head and pipe fallen amid debris of aerosol cans in area of fire origin.

7D. View of remains of fallen, reinforced concrete “fire wall” after fire.

8D. View of north end of north/south fire wall. Note large spalled hole through wall.

9D. View of water discharging from broken sprinkler risers on west side of fire wall. (Note hole in fire wall for reference.) Fire pump believed to have been shut off prior to this photograph and water flow is from bypass around pump.

10D. View of 55 gallon drum storage under canopy at east end of warehouse.
DAYTON FIRE DEPARTMENT PHOTOGRAPHIC SLIDES

Area or Direction of View of Slides
(Description Attached)
SLIDES:

#1 Diagram of Site with Information (Provided by Dayton Fire Dept.).
#2 View toward SE showing remains of “Fire Wall”, small attached bldg., and east wall with office beyond in left background.
#3 Closeup of fire wall remains showing hole in walk Only one panel remaining,
#4 View of south side of fire pump house. Pump and connections have been removed.
#5 View toward SW showing remains of dock and east wall.
#6 View toward SW showing closeup of east wall and openings into office area.
#7 View toward south showing remains of canopy where drums were stored.
#8 View toward west showing office area and remains of east wall of warehouse.
**INCIDENT REPORT**

**FIRE DEPARTMENT**

**INCIDENT NO.** 5701115785

**DATE OF WEEK** 6 Monday 7 Sat 8 Sunday 9 Tuesday 10 Wednesday 11 Thursday 12 Friday

**ALARM TIME** 11:07

**ARRIVAL TIME** 11:16

**TIME IN SERVICE** 11:41

**SITUATION FOUND**

- 22: No Gas Pipeline
- 44: Power line down
- 55: Attack Point
- 72: Bomb Scare
- 61: Smoke alarm
- 56: Unauthorized burning
- 73: Alarm Malfunction
- 57: Structure fire
- 74: Unusual material

**ACTION TAKEN**

- 4: Remove Hazard
- 8: Fill in, Move up

**MUTUAL AID**

- 1: Rec'd

**FIXED PROPERTY USE (Occupancy) Pg. 71-3**

- 18.05 FLAMMABLE LIQUID SPILL

**CORRECT ADDRESS (Up to maximum of 21 characters)**

- 3671 DAYTON PARK DRIVE

**ZIP CODE** 45414

**PHONE** 236-5252

**CO-INSPECTION DISTRICT** 3

**SHIFT** 12

**NO. ALARMS** 3

**METHOD OF ALARM**

- 4: Radio
- 8: Voice signal municipal alarm signal

**TYPE OF MATERIEL**

- 1: Gas pipeline
- 2: Municipal alarm system
- 3: Private alarm system

**COMPLEX**

- 61-2

**AREA OF FIRE ORIGIN**

- 67-68

**FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED**

- 74-76

**METHOD OF EXTINGUISHMENT**

- 3: Pre-connected hydrant only

**ESTIMATED TOTAL DOLLAR LOSS**

- 32.4 million

**DETECTOR PERFORMANCE**

- 1: Detect in room or space of line origin - Open
- 8: Detect in room or space of line origin - Hot

**SPRINKLER PERFORMANCE**

- 1: Equipment operated

**FORM OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE**

- 108-194

**AVENUE OF SMOKE TRAVEL**

- 21: Start Smoke Spread

**MEMBER MAKING REPORT**

- Michael Kenny

**DATE**

- 6-5-7

**COMMENTS**

- See attached narrative sheet
## Incident Report

**Ohio Fire Incident Reporting System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Exp. Mo.</td>
<td>11/05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day of Week</td>
<td>4--Wednesday</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alarm Time</td>
<td>01/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrival Time</td>
<td>01/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time in Service</td>
<td>01/10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Situation Found**

- 22- Gas Rupture
- 32 - Emergency Medical call
- 33 - Locked in - trapped
- 34 - Search
- 35 - Escalate
- 41 - Spill - leak, no fire
- 42 - Explosive, bomb removal
- 43 - Explosive, with fire
- 44 - Power line down
- 55 - Assault Police
- 56 - Unauthorized burning
- 57 - MOre up
- 59 - Other service calls
- 61 - Smoke scale
- 62 - Controlled burn
- 65 - Gas leak, natural gas
- 71 - Miscellaneous

**Action Taken**

- 1 - Escape/rescue
- 2 - Rescue or assistance
- 3 - Investigation only
- 4 - Remove hazard
- 5 - Guard by
- 6 - Salvage
- 7 - Ambulance

**Fixed Property Use (Occupancy)**

- 2010 - Exposure Fire

**Correct Address**

- 3471 Dayton Park Dr

**Occupant Name**

- UnKnown

**Owner Name**

- UnKnown

**Method of Alarm**

- 1 - Telephone call
- 2 - Alarm signal
- 3 - Private alarm
- 4 - Radio
- 5 - Voice signal municipal alarm signal
- 6 - No alarm recorded
- 7 - Undetermined or not recorded

**Number of Injuries**

- 1

**No. Fire Service Personnel Responded**

- 5

**No. Engines Responded**

- 1

**No. Aerial Apparatus Responded**

- 0

**No.其他 Vehicles Responded**

- 0

**Complex**

- No Complex

**Mobile Property Type**

- 98 - Tractor Trailers

**Area of Fire Origin**

- 1/2 - Vehicle

**Form of Heat Ignition**

- 74 - 76 - Exposure

**Type of Material Ignited**

- 78 - 79 - Flammable Liquid

**Estimated Total Dollar Loss**

- 57

**No. Stories**

- 1 - 1 story
- 2 - 2 to 3 stories
- 3 - 3 to 4 stories
- 4 - 4 to 5 stories

**Extent of Damage**

- 1 - Frame, wooden
- 2 - Frame, brick
- 3 - Frame, metal
- 4 - Frame, concrete
- 5 - Frame, glass
- 6 - Frame, other
- 7 - Frame, unknown

**Type of Material Generating Most Smoke**

- 103-104 - Flammable Liquid

**Form of Material Generating Most Smoke**

- 108-109 - Bulk Storage

**Member Making Report**

- FF Michael Kendall

**Remarks**

- Michael Kendall
INCIDENT REPORT

OHIO FIRE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

Fire Department
Dayton Fire Dept

INCIDENT NO: 361612
EXP: 1521
DATE: 12/30/94
TIME: 16:27
LOCATION: 16071 Wagoner Dr

SITUATION FOUND
11. Structure Fire
12. Outside Door Loss
13. Vehicle Fire
14. Brush, grass, leaves
15. Trash, Rubbish
16. Explosion, No other fire
17. Outside with fire

ALARM TIME: 2/11/95 18:03
ARRIVAL TIME: 2/11/95 18:07
TIME IN SERVICE: 4

ACTION TAKEN
1. Extinguishment
2. Rescue or Assistance
3. Investigation only

MUTUAL AID
1. Rec'd

FIREED PROPERTY USE (Occupancy) Pg 23-43
1. Occupancy
2. Commercial
3. Residential
4. Industrial
5. Other

INCIDENT FACTOR Pg 44-45
1. Exposure
2. Extension

CORRECT ADDRESS (Up to maximum of 21 characters)
3671 Dayton Park Dr

OCCUPANT NAME (LAST, FIRST, MI)
UN Known

OWNER NAME (LAST, FIRST, MI)
UN Known

TELEPHONE

FOCUS OF INCIDENT
1. Sooty debris
2. Smoke damage
3. Fire damage
4. Other

METHOD OF ALARM
1. Telephone direct
2. Voice signal municipal alarm system
3. Private alarm system

CO. INSPECTION DISTRICT
NO.

SHIFT
NO. ALARMS

NO. FIRE SERVICE PERSONNEL RESPONDED
64
NO. ENGINES RESPONDED
16
NO. AERIAL APPARATUS RESPONDED
12
NO. OTHER VEHICLES RESPONDED
12

NUMBER OF INJURIES
0
NUMBER OF FATALITIES
0

COMPLEX Pg 61-62
1. No complex

MOBILE PROPERTY TYPE Pg 43-65 (Complete Line 5)
1. NA
2. Tractor

AREA OF FIRE ORIGIN Pg 67-68
1. Vehicle

FORM OF HEAT ILLUMINATION Pg 74-76
1. Exposure

TYPE OF MATERIAL ILLUMINATED Pg 78-79
1. Bulk Storage

FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED Pg 80-81
1. Liquid

METHOD OF EXTINGUISHMENT
1. Water
2. Foam
3. Dry Chemical
4. None
5. Miscellaneous

LEVEL OF FIRE ORIGIN
1. 1-2 story
2. 3-4 story
3. 5-6 story
4. 7 or more story
5.腰部或600英尺
6. Over 70 feet

ESTIMATED TOTAL DOLLAR LOSS
1. Undetermined

CONSTRUCTION TYPE
1. Fire resistant
2. Heavy timber
3. Unprotected noncombustible
4. Exposed wood frame

TYPE OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 103-104
1. Flammable Liquid

EXTENT OF DAMAGE
1. Complete damage
2. Extensive damage
3. Moderate damage
4. Minor damage
5. Undamaged or not reported

SPRINKLER PERFORMANCE
1. Equipment operated
2. Equipment should have operated - did not
3. Equipment was not present
4. Equipment present but too small to operate
5. Other

AVENUE OF SMOKE TRAVEL
1. Exit
2. Ventilation opening
3. Door

FORM OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 106-109
1. Storage

IF MOBILE PROPERTY
1. Year
2. Make
3. Model
4. Serial No
5. International

IF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN ILLUMINATION
1. Year
2. Make
3. Model
4. Serial No

MEMBER MAKING REPORT
1. Name
2. License

DATE

OFFICER IN CHARGE (If different)

SIGNATURE

DATE

Remarks

1. Check if remarks continued on back

Michael Kenn

1. International
2. International

D.C. Dyer 5-27-95

License: 16 N 37

1. International
2. International ALA
3. International ALA
# FIRE SERVICE CASUALTY REPORT

## OHIO FIRE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

**Casualty Name:** Mark Bergman  
**FID:** 5701/1  
**INCIDENT NO.:** 112  
**Exposure NO.:** 190  
**Casualty NO.:** 10  
**Injury Occurred:** 1/5/12  
**MO, DAY, YEAR:** 1/14/12  
**TIME OF INJURY:** 10:21  
**Date of Death:**  

### PRIMARY APPARENT SYMPTOMS

1. **Location:** Strain  
2. **Severity:**  
3. **Time:** 

### PATIENT TAKEN TO

1. **Location:** Dayton Fire Department  
2. **Time:** 

### MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED

1. **Location:** Dayton Fire Department  
2. **Time:** 

### CAUSE OF FIRE FIGHTER INJURY

1. **Location:** Outside Ground Level  
2. **Time:** 

### LIFTING ACCESS

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<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Problem with Equipment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hose</td>
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### PROTECTIVE COAT WORN

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<tr>
<td>Cuff</td>
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### PROTECTIVE TROUSERS WORN

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<td>Cuff</td>
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### GLOVES WORN

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<tr>
<td>Cuff</td>
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<td>No protective cover</td>
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### APPARATUS WORN

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### SPECIAL EQUIPMENT WORN

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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nozzle</td>
<td>No protective cover</td>
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</table>

### OFFICER IN CHARGE

- **Name:** D. L. Day  
- **Date:** 1/5/12  

### CHECK IF REMARKS CONTINUED ON BACK

**Remarks:**

- **Signature:** F. F. Michael R. Kosm  
- **Date:** 1/5/12  

COM 5013
### CIVILIAN CASUALTY REPORT

**NFIRS-2**

**Fire Department**
**Dayton Fire Dept**

**Incident No.** 17054
**Day of the Week** Wed
**Date** 11/05/17
**Time** 15:07

#### Appendix C (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIDD</th>
<th>Incident No.</th>
<th>Exp. No.</th>
<th>Mo.</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Day of the Week</th>
<th>Alarm Time</th>
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<td>5701</td>
<td>17054</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11/05/17</td>
<td>15:07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Casualty Information
- **Full Name:** Curtis Griffith
- **Address:** 2720 Sherer
- **Sex:** Male
- **DOB:** Unknown
- **Age:** 29
- **Telephone:** 274-274

#### Famiiliarity with Structure
- Less than 1 Day: 0
- 1 to 7 Days: 0
- 8 to 30 Days: 0
- 31 to 6 Months: 0
- 7 to 12 Months: 0
- Over 1 Year: 0

#### Location at Ignition
- In the room or space of fire
- On same floor as origin of fire
- Outside building as origin of fire
- Outside building on property
- Not determined or not reported

#### Condition Preventing Escape
- No time to escape, expansion or fire propagated too rapidly
- Fire between casualty and exit
- Locked doors
- Inadequate exits
- Confusion, disorientation
- Moved too slowly
- Victim incapacitated prior to ignition

#### Activity of Time of Injury
- Head, neck
- Body, trunk, back
- Arm
- Leg
- Hand
- Foot

#### Cause of Injury
- Caused by contact with
- Struck by
- Rubbed by
- Slipped on, over, into

#### Nature of Injury
- Burned sphenoid/sphenos
- Burned only
- Inhale smoke only
- Wound, cut, bleeding
- Fracture, fracture

#### Nature of Injury
- Complain of pain
- Shock
- Sore
- Spasm
- Mumps
- Nasal

#### Affiliation
- 1 Fire Service
- 2 Other Emergency Personnel
- 3 Civilian

#### Part of Body Injured
- Head, neck
- Body, trunk, back
- Arm
- Leg
- Hand
- Foot

#### Disposition
- Refused help
- Treated at scene and released
- Taken to hospital by medical vehicle
- Taken to hospital by non fire dept. vehicle
- Taken to other than a hospital
- Died
- Not classified above
- Uninjured or not reported

#### See Remarks on Back

---

**Discontinued**

**Date:** 11/05/17

**Officer in Charge:** David G. Combs

**Manufacturer:** RF Michael R. Henry

**COM 5013**
Fire-building approximately 180,000 sq.ft., one-story tilt-up construction on slab. Steel bar joist roof on center steel post supports, approximately 30 ft. high. Building used for warehousing auto paint finishes, with thinners, additives, etc. Exposure on east: approximately 1400 drums of thinners-lacquers-paints stacked two-three high on pallets. One story office area also on east side of warehouse.

ADT alarm on initial dispatch; also dispatcher reported several phone calls. Second alarm staged at Wagner Ford when large column of black smoke visible from Keowee Street. Upon arrival had third alarm staged.

On arrival, flame showing through roof and entire east half of building involved. Engine 12 on hydrant and supplied Engine 8 deck gun to protect office and drum storage on east side. Engine 21 on hydrant in front of structure; supplied Engine 14 and Truck 14 to protect trailers in dock and parking areas. Aerosal cans raining on crews. Decision not to supply sprinkler system: severe exposure hazard so close to building with sprinkler connections facing fire building - especially since sprinkler piping already probably compromised.

Truck 11 assigned to east sector, under command of Central 2. West 2 assigned as planning sector. Unmanned monitors set up on east exposures as fire progressed.

Tactical decision to attempt to stop fire at north-south firewall in center of structure. However, planning sector found heavy extension into west side before any actual company assignments could be made.

Occupants of structure, approximately 30, reported an employee injury to arriving firefighters, and Engine 4 assisted Medic 4 with lift - truck operator burned seriously on legs. Engine 4 later assigned as brand patrol.
At approximately 2150 Chief I took command, made Chief 3 operation sector. Chief I's strategy was to maintain streams on exposures - which were all on drained concrete pad - but to throw no water on burning structure. The building sits directly over city wellfields, and possible contamination of water supply from run-off became first priority.

Warehouse area of structure a total loss. Drum storage never involved in fire, though some damage later as walls collapsed. Offices sustained some minor water damage, but records preserved and recovered. Seventeen truck trailers on scene heavily or totally damaged; dozens of others not damaged and later removed from parking area.

Injury to firefighter minor (pulled muscle).

Fire officially contained at 0012 on 5-28-87, and under control at 1004 on 6-2-87.
REMARKS:

Fire allowed to burn freely until self-extinguished: Goal to not contaminate water supply:

Thursday (28th): Met with Sherwin-Williams and OEPA, RAPCA, other interested parties, to determine effect of fire on environment, while developing plan to continue protection of exposures on east side of building. Fire still free burning. Flare up caused staging of a 2nd alarm assignment at site. Run-off to Miami River contained and solvents skimmed and pumped off. Basic operation still geared around protecting well field. Command trailer installed. Valuables in office area turned over to Sherwin-Williams representatives.

Friday (29th): Met with federal and state EPA and RAPCA to secure site safety plan. Smoke and fire diminishing, but still visible throughout complex. Sherwin-Williams given permission to remove undamaged semis and trailers.

Saturday (30th): Sherwin-Williams contracted with O-H Material to be prime clean up contractor. Environmental monitoring showed no contamination of groundwater, but some of ground in site and river near drains. Sherwin-Williams given permission to remove all items in the office area. Dave Tabar of Sherwin-Williams removed inventory sheet from command post. Total inventory as of 5-16-87 in excess of 1.7 million gallons.

Sunday (31st): Removal of trailers next to building. Walls dismantled. Fire down to 5-6 spots, glow with light smoke. Site safety plan supposed to be developed by O-H Material for review by fire department. Containment dike for run-off under construction.

Monday (1st): Containment dike completed. Fire still smolders - some hot spots and vapors. Some barrels removed from east side - removal of trailers. Site safety plan in place. Clean up to start at No. 1 door at front loading dock. Work during daylight only. Reduced fire department to one engine and one truck at night. Barrel removal halted until proper forklift is at site.

Tuesday (2nd): Fire placed under control and loss established.
Sherwin Williams Fire - Wednesday, May 27, 1987, at 2107 Hours - Third Alarm
3671 Dayton Park Drive at Wagoner Ford Road

TELEPHONE BOARD #1

Dispatcher: 2105

Yeah, Fire Box No. 455 goes to Sherwin Williams, 3671 Dayton Park Dr.

Dispatcher: What was that, 30 what

Dispatcher: 455

Right

Dispatcher: OK, are you going to have a runner enroute

Dispatcher: got one enroute now

Dispatcher: OK, we'll get them on the way

Dispatcher: 2106 Dayton Fire Department

Caller: I want to report a fire at the Sherwin Williams Warehouse on Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: We got them on the way sir

Caller: OK, you might want to send some ambulances

Dispatcher: 2107 Dayton Fire Department

Yes, I'm an employee of B & O Railroad, there's a fire at Dayton Industrial Park, has there been a report

Dispatcher: At Sherwin Williams

Caller: Ah, I guess I'm not sure where it's at

Dispatcher: There on Dayton Park Road, we got them on the way sir

Dispatcher: All right, thank you

Dispatcher: Thank you

Dispatcher: 2108 Dayton Fire

Yeah, there's a fire out here I'm at Troy and Stanley

Dispatcher: Yes ma'am we've got them on the way

Dispatcher: Thank you

Dispatcher: 2108 Dayton Fire

Yes I have an emergency, need ah fire, we have a fire at 3671 Dayton Park Drive (employee)

Dispatcher: They're on their way ma'am

Dispatcher: Thank you very much

Dispatcher: Bye

Dispatcher: Yeah, Dispatch

There is a fire, I think it's right in front of North Lake Hills but I can't tell from where I'm standing

Dispatcher: Over by Chuck Wagon Lane, over in that area

Caller: North Lake Hills, Old Troy Pike

Dispatcher: Yeah, we've got them on the way ma'am

Dispatcher: OK, thank you

Dispatcher: OK
Dispatcher calling Police Dispatcher

Dispatcher: We need a little assistance out at Wagoner Ford and Needmore
Uh huh, do you need any traffic control there today

Dispatcher: Ah, probably going to - OK

Dispatcher: It's on Dayton Park Road is where the fire is
Dayton Park Road, OK

Dispatcher: OK, thank you

Dispatcher: Dispatch
Ah, Rescue 1 is back in quarters, at Co.2's and I've got four guys if you want me to man an Engine 2, or I've got four guys however you want me to do, the truck crew my engine crew went ahead and put the truck in service and took that

Dispatcher: OK, you might as well put the engine in service then
OK, we'll be in service with Engine 2

Dispatcher: OK, thanks

Dispatcher: 2117 Dayton Fire
Yeah, this is Mr. ____________ speaking, have you got a report of a fire off Troy Street

Dispatcher: Yes we do sir, we've got them on the way
OK, that's really smoking

Dispatcher: 2118 Dayton Fire
Yes, I'm sure you're aware there's a fire at Sherwin Williams on Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: Yes sir, we are
OK, now we're directly across the street from there, is there any danger to my people working there

Dispatcher: As far as I know, at this time sir, I can't say, but if there is apparently any danger, I'm sure that they will evacuate	
OK, I can leave my people working

Dispatcher: As far as I know
OK

Dispatcher: We've got people out there working, you know, if they see if things are dangerous, they'll get them out
OK

Dispatcher: 2118 Dayton Fire
Yeah, could you tell me are paramedics or ambulance on the way to 3671 Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: Yes ma'am
OK, cause we got a guy burning, and I didn't know if the ambulance had

Dispatcher: They're on the way
OK, thanks
Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire
Yes sir, we're up on Earnst and North Main is there a fire burning on the other side of Riverside somewhere.
Dispatcher: Yes sir, there is, and I'm too busy to talk to you at this time sir OK, thank you
Dispatcher: Yes sir
Caller: Has anybody reported a fire out here on Brandt Pike
Dispatcher: Yes
OK, thanks
Dispatcher: 2120 Dayton Fire
I don't know if anybody's called or not, I live at 2329 Troy St.
Dispatcher: Yeah
And, ah behind the trailers back here, there's something burning back here
Dispatcher: Yes sir, we're aware of it, they're on the scene
OK, thank you
Dispatcher: 2121 Dayton Fire
Caller: Yes, I live at 104 Delaware looking out my back door, toward Main Street, there's a huge of black smoke and
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, we're well aware of that, we have fire equipment on the scene there
Oh, OK
Dispatcher: 2121 Dayton Fire
Caller: Yes, we have a fire here off of Troy Street, have you gotten that
Dispatcher: Yes, ma'am, they're there
OK, then, I didn't hear the fire trucks, I thought I better call
Dispatcher: Thank you ma'am
Thank you
Dispatcher: 2121 Dayton Fire
Caller: Yes, I live out around 202 and I'm in an apartment building and see flames coming above the apartment building, I'm not quite sure how far over it is, but I know it's on Route 202
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, we've got fire crews on the scene over there
Already
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am
Thank you, bye bye
Dispatcher: 2122 Dayton Fire
Has anybody reported a fire across the street from the
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, they have
OK, thank you
Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire
Yes, I'm______ on St. Adalbert across from the Sohio Oil thing, and it's on fire
Dispatcher: There's a fire out there, yes ma'am, we've got equipment on the scene
OK, with-me living this close, should I leave
Dispatcher: At this time ma'am, I would say no
OK, ah, will we be contacted if we should
-Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, you will be
OK, thank you
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, bye
Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire
Yes, I live on Vermont Street, and I can see that flames and I was wondering
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, we've got crews out there now
Well everybody on the street is taking off, and I was
Dispatcher: Well, I'm sorry ma'am, I really don't have time to talk to you, as far as I can tell at this time: you're in no danger
Oh, can you tell me what it is
Dispatcher: It's a building out there burning, ma'am
Is it chemicals or
Dispatcher: Ma'am I don't know, I'm not there, I'm sorry I'm curt with you but I'm awfully busy right now
We're in no danger
Dispatcher: No ma'l'am
All right, thank you

2125 Dayton Fire
Ah, yes I want to report a possible fire in the, in the
200 block of Baltimore Street
Dispatcher: 200 block of where
Baltimore Street
Dispatcher: Beckmore
Dispatcher: I'll I
BALTIMORE
Dispatcher: Oh, Baltimore
Right across from the park, Patterson Park
Dispatcher: Ah, do you have any idea what's burning
No, I don't know, I just see smoke up in the air and there's a bunch of flames shooting down there, I don't know what it is but I live in the 100 block and some of the neighbors next door went up that way, and I said well I'll go head and call
Dispatcher: Well, we have a fire out that way, we've got crews on the scene
Oh, do you, Oh, I didn't know, then I was just making sure someone knew about it
Dispatcher; OK, thank you
OK, thank you

2125 Dayton Fire
Hi, this is Joe ________, night supervisor at Earnst Enterprises on Wagoner Ford Road
Dispatcher: Yes sir
I was wondering if I should get my men out of here or not
I noticed that fire down there at AGA or whatever it's at
Dispatcher: Well, all I can tell you at this time sir, is they haven't said anything to us about any evacuations
OK
Dispatcher: I'm sure if it gets to the point that somebody should be evacuated they will do it
All right
2126 Dayton Fire
Hello, I was wondering if you have any information about a
fire on Wagoner Ford Road
Dispatcher: No sir, I have no information at this time
You don't know what it is that's burning there
Dispatcher: No sir, and I don't have to talk about it
OK
Dispatcher: Thank you

2126 Dayton Fire
Yeah, this is Greg from Preston Trucking, we're pretty close
to that fire that is down the street, ah is that that chemical
place
Dispatcher: Ah, Sherwin Williams Paints
Sherwin Williams
Yeah
Dispatcher: Is there going to be any evacuation
Ah, at this time we haven't heard anything about any anticipation
of it
OK, cause we're pretty close
Dispatcher: Well, I'm sure if they feel that it's necessary, they will
evacuate the other people in the area sir
Thank you very much
Dispatcher: Yes sir

2126 Dayton Fire
Yes, are you aware of the fire at Sohio
Dispatcher: It's not Sohio sir, and yes we have equipment out there
Is-it should we leave the area
Dispatcher: Ah, at this time I would say no sir, they have not been any
alarm for evacuation
And it's not Sohio
Dispatcher: No it's not
OK
Dispatcher: Sir, I'm sorry I don't have time to talk to you I'm really busy

2127 Dayton Fire
OK, I live at 3801 South Shore Drive, in Dayton, and there's
a fire over the apartment across from my window I didn't
know if anyone had called
Dispatcher: Are you sure it's coming from the apartment or are you
looking over the top of it
I'm looking over the top of the apartment across the yard from me
Dispatcher: OK, and you're seeing an extreme amount of smoke and flames
I'm seeing flames and smoke, yes black smoke
Dispatcher: OK, could that fire you're looking at be over ah off Wagoner
Ford Road
I don't think so, I think it's right here in this housing
development, cause it's the only thing I can see from where I'm at
Dispatcher: 3801 South Shore
Yeah, that's my address, I don't know what that address is over there
but if you come around here, you'll see it yourself
Dispatcher: Well we've got a big fire down on Needmore Road there and the
flames may be what you're looking at
I don't know
Dispatcher: What's your phone number
My phone number here is 237-8078
Dispatcher: OK, have you attempted to walk over to that building and see
No my family lives there and I 'told them to call the Fire Department and they ran out of the house so I thought I'd call, I don't know, maybe I'm just being an alarmist maybe you're right, you know, but

Dispatcher: 38 across from 3801 South Shore, we'll get somebody to check it out OK, thank you

2129 Dayton Fire
Yeah, this is Jerry over at Andy's, you got a report on this fire over here

Dispatcher: Oh, yes sir
Where's that at over here, I can see flames

Dispatcher: Over off Needmore Road
Off of Needmore, all right

2129 Dayton Fire
Ah, hi, I live at 606 Brandt, which is right across the street from all the gas and oil tanks, has anybody reported a fire

Dispatcher: They sure have ma'am
Oh, OK, cause we haven't seen any action yet, OK, thanks
Right

2129 Dayton Fire
Do you have anything about a fire on Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: Yes sir we do
Is there any point in anybody being evacuated at this time

Dispatcher: Not at this time no sir
Well, OK, we live close to it and I'm just wondering if we should be out or anything breathing it

Dispatcher: No, I don't know of any reason for alarm at this time OK, thank you

2130 Dayton Fire
Yes sir, that fire's that's on the east end, can you tell me if that's some,that 's coming from that is toxic or not

Dispatcher: No
You don't know

Dispatcher: As far as I can tell you at this time, we have no reason for alarm OK, I just wanted to check, I had some kids out playing and

Dispatcher: Right; I can understand that sir.

(Tape Transcription from Dispatch Log Tape Ended) Hours
Sherwin Williams Fire - Wednesday, May 27, 1987 at 2107 hours - Third Alarm
3671 Dayton Park Drive at Wagoner Ford Road

TELEPHONE BOARD #2 -

Dispatcher: 2106 Dayton Fire Department
Ah, yeah I don't know if there's been a report but there's a fire at the Sherwin Williams Warehouse at on Dayton Park Drive
Dispatcher: They're on the way sir
OK, ah you might want to send some ambulances down there too
Dispatcher: Where's that
The same place
Dispatcher: Why's that, are there a lot of people still there
Oh, yeah, they're working
Dispatcher: Do they know it's on fire
They're out of the place but it's burning bad
Dispatcher: OK
Thank you
Dispatcher: Thank you

Dispatcher: 2107 Dayton Fire Department
Yeah, this is Ted ______ at Kittyhawk Golf Course, there's a big explosion
Dispatcher: Yeah, we've got them on the way, Sherwin Williams
Yeah, right off Wagoner Ford Road
Dispatcher: Yeah, we got them on the way
OK
Dispatcher: Thank you sir

Dispatcher: 2109 Dayton Fire Department
Ah, yes we need a fire truck out on Troy Pike, Troy Street
you know where North Lake Hills is, right across the street from North Lake Hills, they have a great big old bundle of fire
Dispatcher: What's burning
I have no idea, my husband just went over there to find out
Dispatcher: Now we've got a fire over on Dayton Park Drive, is that what he's seeing
Dayton Park Drive, is that close to Troy Street
Dispatcher: Well yeah, you can see it from there, it would be over there by the golf course, is it a building
I can't tell we just see big black smoke coming up in the air
Dispatcher: OK, that would be over there at that Dayton Park Drive, we've got a second alarm fire over there and from where you're at you can see straight through
OK, I just wanted to make sure
Dispatcher: OK, thank you

(Several calls from residences -interrupted on transcription by hearing Radio and PA conversation)

Dispatcher: 2112 Dayton Fire Department
I know you're busy,
Yes, this is Patty from Huber Heights Fire,/do you have a fire in the area of Needmore and Wagoner Ford.
Dispatcher: Yeah, up there on Chuck Wagon Lane
Bye
Dispatcher calling Chief 3
Hello
Dispatcher:  Yeah, Paul, we've got , Paul
No, this is his son I don't know where he is right now
Dispatcher:  OK, if you can get a hold of him, tell him we have a third
alarm fire at Dayton Park Drive
Dayton Park , all right

Hemmeter:  We've got a third alarm at Sherwin Williams over on
Dayton Park Drive, I'm on my way

Dispatch calling Chief 1
Chief's Wife:  He's on the other phone, he'll be with you in a minute
Chief 1  Send 15's on up will you please
Dispatcher:  Chief
Just send 15's on up I'm hearing it
Dispatcher:  OK
Chief 1  Thank you
Dispatcher:  2116
Ah, yes sir, anybody called in for that fire over
Dispatcher:  Yes they have, they're already over there
All right, thank you
Dispatcher:  2119 Dayton Fire Department
Yeah, there's a fire over on, I think it's Commerce Park
Dispatcher :  Yeah, we've got a third alarm fire going ma'am
Betterhurry
Dispatcher:  They're there, they're there
Dispatcher:  2119 Dayton Fire Department
I'm calling from 150 Jenny Road
Dispatcher:  Yeah, we've got crews on the scene for a big fire over there
OK, I called to make sure

Chief 1:  What companies do you have
Dispatcher:  Hold on just a second
Dispatcher:  Coleman Yeah, Chief
Chief 1:  What companies do you have in reserve
Dispatcher:  Ah, the way it looks right now we don't have anybody left
Chief 1:  No, no what reserve apparatus, what companies have reserve
apparatus (Call transferred to Supervisor's position in
Dispatch Center - not recorded on Dispatch Log Tape)
Dispatcher:  2119 Dayton Fire Department
Ah, yes I live off of Valley Street, looking from Valley
over toward Brandt you have a big fire
Dispatcher:  Yeah, we've got a third alarm fire going sir
Oh, sorry
Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire Department
Yes, have you been called about the fire on __________

Dispatcher: Yes we have
OK, thank you

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire
Yeah, I live on Vermont Street and I can see the flames and I wondered

Dispatcher: Hung up

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire
Yeah, we're at R & R over on Valley have you got a report of a fire

Dispatcher: Yeah, it's over on it's by the Golf Course,
Golf Course

Dispatcher: Dispatch
Chief I just come to 15's and told us to call and tell you that Engine 15 is sitting here in the barn

Dispatcher: Well they shouldn't be
Well it is

Dispatcher: Huh
They told him he called down there they said they you guys told somebody that we weren't that there was nobody here we have not been dispatched, we're still here

Dispatcher: OK, thanks

(Tape Transcription from Dispatch Log Tape Ended) - 2126 Hours
Sherwin Williams Fire - May 27, 1987 (Wednesday) at 2107 Hours - Third Alarm
3671 Dayton Park Drive at Wagoner Ford Road

RADIO AND PA

Dispatcher: Box 455 that will be at Sherwin Williams Paints,
3671 Dayton Park Road
That's Box 455, that will be Sherwin Williams Paints,
3671 Dayton Park Road, we've received a couple calls on
this, Chuck Wagon Lane will be your cross
That will be Engines 12, 21, 8, Truck 14 and the East Chief
Engines 12, 21, 8, 14, Truck 14, and the East Chief
OK, Engine 12, 21, 8, Truck 14, East Chief - All Clear
2107 Bowersock

Dispatcher: Dispatch to East 2 we're still receiving numerous calls,
says there's an explosion and quite a bit of fire at'
Sherwin Williams

East 3: Clearly; there's a large amount of smoke in the area, go head
and dispatch me a full second. alarm, stage them to the
entrance there by the Kittyhawk Golf Course

Dispatcher: 2108

East 2: East 2 Dispatcher, go head and start me that second
chief, make sure you notify Chief 3

Dispatcher: 2108

Central 2: Central 2 Dispatcher, Central 2's responding

Dispatcher: OK, Central 2, 2109

Dispatcher: All companies, we're on master, we have a fire at
Sherwin Williams Paints, 3671 Dayton Park Road, first
alarm response is enroute we're dispatching Engine 14, 4, 2,
Engine 18, Truck 2, Truck 11, Central Chief

Dispatcher: That's Engines 14, 4, 2, 18, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief
OK, Truck 2, Truck 11 you clear on the air
Dispatcher, Engine 14 is clear and responding
Dispatcher: OK Engine 14, 4, 2, 18's, Central Chief clear,
Truck 11 are you clear on the air
2110 Bowersock

Truck 2 dispatcher, Truck 2 is out of service, you can
place Rescue 1 back in service
That's clear Truck 2 2111

Engine 9's in service

Engine 2 is out of service, Truck 2 is responding!!

Engine 9's in service
OK, Engine 9 2111

Clear
Paramedic 2 is in service, I’ll be enroute to the other scene 2111

Paramedic 2: Do you have a medic unit responding over there
Dispatcher: Not yet, 2111 Clear

Engine 18 Dispatcher, give us a repeat on the address
That will be 3671 Dayton Park Road
18 clear
2111

Dispatcher: Medic 4 to Dispatch, we can respond
Car calling repeat
Dispatcher: Medic 4 to Dispatch, we can respond to that fire
Dispatcher: OK, Medic 4 respond to 3671 Dayton Park 2112
4's clear

West 2's in service
2112

Truck 2 Dispatcher, we're responding on that Engine 2 is out of service.

Engine 8's on the scene, we have a whole building completely involved
Dispatcher: 2113

East 2 Dispatcher, I’m on the scene, we've got a large building, about 200 x oh possibly 300, pretty well fully involved. Stage me a third alarm make sure the third alarm response stays out on Wagoner Ford Road. I’ll also need dispatch the foam truck, I’ll be Sherwin Williams Command. 2114

Dispatcher: Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16, Truck 15, and the West Chief respond to 3671 Dayton Park Drive, that will be Sherwin Williams, that's a third alarm
Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 15 and the West Chief
OK, Truck 15, Engine Truck 16, Engine 9 you clear
Engine 9 clear
Dispatcher: Engine 11 (responding) Companies on the scene you're on master You're on Channel 1

Engine 11 you clear
Clear
Dispatcher: West Chief
West Chief clear
All clear 2116

Paramedic 2 to dispatcher, would you have all the medic crews use their telemetry channel 9 to your communication, so they don't mess up our radio traffic out here
Dispatcher: OK, Paramedic 2
All Medic companies are you clear on that, use your telemetry instead of the radio channels
Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire  
May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours  
Radio and PA - Page 3

East 2: We'll need one, two medics here on the fire scene, as soon as you can get them here, we do have injuries also, give new rundown of the second alarm response you've got staged out there on Wagoner Ford

Truck 11 on the scene  
21:18

East 2: Command to Dispatcher, tell me again what was my second alarm dispatch

Dispatcher: OK, command your second alarm response was Engine 14, 4, 2, 18, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief

Chief 3 to Dispatcher, we're going to need a lot of traffic control on Wagoner Ford, this is a huge building fully involved, and we have gawkers taking up all of Wagoner Ford  
2120

Command to Dispatcher, quote, listen carefully, I need a run down of the first alarm, second alarm, third alarm companies, give it to me slow so I know exactly what I've got here, what you dispatched

Dispatcher: OK, Command, first alarm - Engine 12, 21, 8, Truck 14  
Clear so far

Dispatcher: Standby a second. OK, Command your second alarm Engine 14, 4, 2, 18, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief Clear, third alarm

Dispatcher: Third Alarm - Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16 and Truck 15

Chief 1 dispatcher, responding  
2127

Chief 1: Are you aware there is somebody at 15's, Engine 15 We are now Medic 15 to the dispatcher, we're in service from Good Sam do you want us to report to the fire scene

Dispatcher: Standby at this time, Medic 15 Clear standing by

Medic 4 removing one to the Valley, burn 'victim  
2128

Dispatcher: 4's is clear

16's in service from St. Elizabeth Engine 16's in the staging area  
2129

Chief 13: Command to Dispatch, this entire structure it is a very large 1 story structure full of flammables. It is completely involved and it will be a total loss  
2132
Chief 3: As far as possible, I'm going to commit no more resource to the area, our position right now is one of standing by in a very defensive posture
2133
Clear

Dispatcher: Engine 2, made an investigation in the 2000 block of Troy Street, we don't know if that's a separate fire or if the people are seeing the fire over on Dayton Park Drive but we're getting a lot of calls about, I have no other information except it's in the, gentleman called from 2050 Troy and he said across the street from him there was a large amount of smoke, your cross street will be Jergens
OK, Engine 2, 2135 West

Medic 8's in service from Good Sam, do you want us to report to the fire scene
Ah, standby in the area Medic 8
Clear

Dispatcher: Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command
Go head

Dispatcher: Do you need any medic units over there......Dayton Park Command, were you clear on that?
Command to Dispatch, ah hold that, we have two medic units on the scene that we are aware of! Medic 10 and Box 21 is on the scene, that will be sufficient for the time being

Dispatcher Very good, thank you much, we need them

Inspection 1 is on the air and heading out for the scene
2137

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 in service
2137

Chief 1 on scene

Engine 2 dispatcher, this call that was called in on Troy Street is part of their large third alarm fire, you can place Engine 2 in service

Dispatcher: OK, that's what I thought, 2142
Engine 2 clear

Chief 3 to Dispatch, Chief 3 to all units on the fire scene
Chief 1 will be Incident Command, Chief 3 will be Operations Command, please address us by those titles, I want all Sector Officers go to Channel 3, are you clear on that dispatch

Dispatcher: OK, Chief 3, you are Operations
That's clear
Chief 1 is
Chief 1 will be Incident Command

Incident, OK, and what was the rest of it then?

All Command Officers to Channel 3
2144
Chief 1 will be Dayton Park Command
Clear
Investigator 8 Dispatcher, I'm in the area at the scene 2145

Chief 1 Dispatcher, I'm taking command of the fire, Command Post remains at the northwest corner of the building, this is, a 200 x 100' 20' single story building, totally involved probable total loss, will casualties, two we know of, one reported missing. I also have exposures to trailers. Long time on this operation

Dispatcher: Thank you 2146 Clear

Dispatcher: Car calling, repeat West 1 dispatcher, what is the address of the third alarm fire 3671 Dayton Park Drive, that runs off Chuck Wagner Lane which is a street that goes into, ah, off Wagoner Ford Road Clear 2149

Dayton Park Command dispatcher, I'll need police assistance on the scene, we're starting to get infiltration of spectators

Dispatcher: Police have been notified about this I need them on the scene 2150

Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command, I informed the Police of the situation and asked for as big as task force as I could possibly muster 2151 That's clear, we're going to have a tremendous problem with the crowd overrunning this fire scene and it is exploding and still detonating in and around the fire, we cannot guarantee anybody's safety, let alone ours I've asked for a battalion (interruption by sounding signal) (conversation ended)

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 responding to Station 15 That's clear, 2152

Investigator 1 on the air 2155 Clear

Dayton Dispatcher Kettering 4 out at Station 15

Chief 1: Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, can you give me a rundown of what we've got in protecting the rest of the city in terms of Chief Officers and equipment

Dispatcher: OK, at this time we have Engine 10, we have at Co. 2's 15's at Co. 4's, Madison, truck and a Moraine engine at Co. 11's We got Engine and Truck 13 in quarters, Harrison Township has a truck and an engine at Co. 14's, Kettering engine and truck at 15's and Engine 17. We're well covered as far as the city's concerned

Chief 1: Do you have Chief Officers in three districts?

Dispatcher: There's some enroute now
Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
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Chief 1: Take your first 3 chief officers that report on the air and assign them districts, send the next chief officers to this fire. I do not need chief officer support more than I need them to protect the city

Dispatcher: That's clear, we have Chief 4 at Headquarters also

Dispatcher to East 1, Dispatcher West 1

East 1: Go head, East 1

Dispatcher: Yeah, are you enroute to quarters now

Dispatcher: I'm enroute to 2's to pick up a driver

Dispatcher: That's clear, then you'll take the East side Chief then

East 1 clear

Dispatcher to West 1

West 1, I've been given assignment by Operations Command

Dispatcher: I'm nearly on the scene of the fire now

Chief '1: Cancel that, this is Incident Command, go run the district we'll get you something else

Dispatcher: West 1 you'll be West Side Chief

West 1 clear

2159

Investigator 4 on scene

2204

Dispatcher to Incident Command, have any removals been made to area hospitals

Dispatcher: We have an indication that we have 1 removal but I don't know where the individual was removed to

Dispatcher: That's clear 2204

Medic 4 to Dispatch that removal was made by us to the Valley

2205

4's is in service and clear

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher. has the City Manager been notified of this incident?'

Dispatcher: Could you repeat your message please

Dispatcher: Has the City Manager been notified of this incident?

Dispatcher: We're notifying him now

Dispatcher: Thank you

2205

Dispatcher to Incident Command

Chief 1: Command go head

Dispatcher: We're getting a lot of calls, has there been any talk about evacuation out there

Chief 1: No, evacuation at this point is not necessary, we have a fire that is essentially isolated with the exception of an exposure of trailers around the building, the closest other structures are at least 100' away, there is a considerable amount of exploding and evolving fire, at this point however, does not need evacuation

Dispatcher: That's clear, 2209
Chief 1, the Assistant Manager is concerned with the reclamation fields out there as far as water tables, is there any concern there, does he need to contact anybody?

Chief 1:
We have made contact with the Water Department, they're enroute and we also have the Environmental Specialist from the Water Department on scene monitoring that situation. You can assure him that we're taking a close look at it and we'll make whatever decisions we need to secure the water system.

Dispatcher:
He requested that we contact him if there is any significant changes, so if you want to relay that through us, we can handle it.

Dispatcher:
Dispatcher to Incident Command
Command go head

Dispatcher:
Yes sir, we have the names of six employees from out there and when this incident occurred they fled the scene, but we do have six names here if you need any.

Chief 1:
I would like to confirm if all six are able to talk to you, we’ve made one removal, if you can talk to the other five or talk to someone who has, I’d like to know that, we’re treating it as though we have victims.

Dispatcher:
OK, each one of these people on the list have been confirmed.

Chief 1:
So, in other words, all six have been confirmed as alive.

Dispatcher:
That is correct, 2212
One injury

Dispatcher:
We've have Medic call us when they get back with the injury and get a report.
Thank you

2212

Investigator 1 Dispatcher why don't you contact Investigator 7 have them: stop by the Valley and let him talk to that person

Dispatcher:
2213, Investigator 7
Go head

Dispatcher:
Would you stop by the Valley and talk to the person removed from Wagoner Ford
I couldn't copy you

Dispatcher:
Would you stop by Miami Valley Hospital and talk to the individual who was removed from Wagoner Ford Road
That's clear sir

Dispatcher:
That is per Investigator 1 at 2213

Command to Dispatcher, could you confirm whether or not you talked to a Joe Crone

Dispatcher:
No, we that's not one of the names we have sir

Chief 1:
That's the one we're hunting

2213

Inspector 4 in service
2213
Inspector 4 clear

Training Center responding to the fire on Dayton Park
2214
Clear
Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, were you able to contact the Public Information Officer
Dispatcher: We're working on that now
Thank you

Dispatcher Dayton Fire Command
Chief 1: Command go head
Do you have a Medical Sector there, we need to know what medics we have on the scene
Chief 1: I’ll get back with you in just a second, we do have Chief 5 yes, Chief 5 is Medical Sector
2217

Investigator 1 is on the scene
2218

Command to Dispatcher, we have Medic 4 and Medic 10 along with Harrison Township Medic, and a Box 21 Unit assigned to this, make that Medic 8 and Medic 10
Dispatcher: Thank you, 2218
That's clear, we'll hold those by the way
Dispatcher: That's clear, 2218.

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, do you have any other day off chief officers responding to this fire
Dispatcher: That's negative
None available
Dispatcher: We have them in the district we can send out
I'm asking you were they contacted and they did not respond
Dispatcher: Command, every chief that we got a hold of is responding!!
Chief 1 I can't hear you
Dispatcher: Every chief we got a hold of is responding
Chief 1 That's clear, now I'm going to ask you again, do you have enough that your districts are filled and a surplus of chief officers are coming to the fire scene
Dispatcher: We have no surplus at this time
That's clear
Dispatcher: The districts are covered
All 3 three districts are covered
Dispatcher: Affirmative
Thank you
2220

Investigator 7 I’ll be out at the Valley,
2223

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher can we get some kine of a canteen out here, we've got some people that are getting pretty thirsty and dehydrated, Box 21, Red Cross, somebody would help
Dispatcher: I believe Red Cross is enroute and Box 21 also
Chief 1: That's clear

Command to Dispatcher, have you been able to contact anybody from the Training Center
They're on their way out there
Chief 1 Clear, thank you
2227
Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
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Dispatcher: Investigator 5 on the scene
2232

Chief 1: Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command
Command go head
The man that you were looking for, Joe Crone, he is home
Clear, thank you
2230

Garage 4 Dispatch
Go head
Garage and Garage 2 are on their way to the scene on the air
2234

Maintenance 3 Dispatch
Go head
Maintenance 3 and 4 we're enroute to the scene with fuel
2237

Maintenance 3: Would you repeat your message please
Maintenance 3 and 4 are enroute to the scene with diesel fuel
2237

Dispatcher: Do you go off Wagoner Ford Road
Would you repeat your message
Is the location off Wagoner Ford Road
2237

Dispatcher: At Dayton Park Drive
Clear
2237

Dispatcher: Incident Command, have the site management people from that company contacted you at the scene
Yes they have
2237

Dispatcher: Clear, they have a liaison established at the Radisson they were contacting us to make sure you had people on the scene
Yes plant manager's been here

Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, can you give me a rundown on the time of alarm, and calls for equipment
2249

Dispatcher: OK, Incident Command at 2107 we sent the first alarm, at 2110 we sent a second alarm response, and then at 2116 a third alarm response was sent
2249

Chief 1: That's clear, thank you
2249

Command to Dispatcher, has EPA been notified of this fire
Not at this time
2253

Chief 1: Ah, call their office and at least make them aware of what's happening
2253

Dispatcher to Incident Command
Go head
2253

Dispatcher: Did you say you did have a fatality out there
2253

Chief 1: We are unable to determine that at this time
OK, so you won't be needing the chaplains or anything out there
We will notify you
Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
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Dispatcher: That's clear 2255

Dispatcher to Incident Command, EPA has been aware of the situation

Chief 1: That's clear 2257

Investigation 7 cleared from Miami Valley enroute to the scene 2304

Medic 14 Dispatcher.
Go head
We're in service with the medic 2306

Command to Dispatcher, I understand you had an inquiry about the need for a chaplain
Yes we did

Chief 1: I don't think we'll need them for anybody in the normal sense here, we believe we've got everybody accounted for ah, and short of some kind of injury to personnel here or breakdown by management here, I don't think we'll need any of the chaplains assistance at this point

Dispatcher: 2316:

Dispatch to Incident Command

Chief 1: Incident Command Dispatcher, go head

Dispatcher: OK, Wright Pat called us on the phone and said if there is a need for foam that they do have a foam truck available

Chief 1: That's clear, we'll keep that in mind as a resource, we're still trying to determine whether or not we should make an application of an extinguishing agent because of the possible contamination of the wellfield

Chief 1: Thank you

Medic18 Dayton Dispatcher, Medic18 will be in service

Medic 18 2328
Medic 18 clear

Dispatcher: Medic 18' come down to fill in at 4's
Clear 2328

Dispatcher: Medic 18 fill in at 13's
Clear 2329

Medic 18, Dispatcher to Medic 18
Go head
Are you a two person crew right now
Affirmative

Medic 18, go by Co. 14's pick up 1 paramedic there and you'll be running with 3 paramedics
That's clear we'll be enroute to Co. 14

Dispatcher: That's clear 2333
Inspection 3 enroute to the fire scene

Dispatcher: Maintenance 3 did you say you're enroute to the fire scene
Inspection 3, that is correct
Dispatcher: Maintenance 3 you're breaking up cannot copy
Inspection 3 is enroute to the fire scene
Dispatcher: That's Inspection 3?
That's correct
2335

Investigator 1 to Dispatcher, do you have a location as to where the employees went to-m t
Dispatcher: They've been cal 'ling in from all over
They didn't go to meet at one place or location
Dispatcher: Not that I know of
Clear
Dispatcher: 2336

Dispatcher to all companies, if you have any unassigned personnel in quarters', call 3316,
That's dispatcher to all companies, if you have any unassigned personnel in quarters at this time, call 3316. 2340

Dispatcher to Investigation:
Investigator 1 Dispatch
Go head
You called me
Yes sir, we have a report that a few of the employees from there are up at the restaurant on Webster and Wagoner Ford At Webster and Wagoner Ford
That's correct
Clear thank you
2342

Medic 18 to Dispatch, we have our third person enroute to co. 13's
2347

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 leaving Station 15 enroute to quarters
Dispatcher: Thank you, Kettering 2347

May 28, 1987

Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, this fire is essentially confined, not under control, we will probably have crews here throughout the night, but I do want to indicate that it is no longer in such a mode that it is continuing to expand, but what we got will burn for a considerable length. of time
Dispatcher: Thank you command 0012
Thank you
Chief 1: Dispatcher to Incident Command
Dispatcher: Command go head
Chief 1: Will you be needing anymore Garage personnel out there, they have 3 at the Garage at this time
Dispatcher: I don't know, we're going to have a fueling problem that kind of problem over a long hall operation, these crews will be here all night and probably into tomorrow
Dispatcher: 0018

Command to Dispatcher, would you have the Central Chief get his explosive meter and run it out here, if he's not sure as to the operating condition of the explosive meter, poll the chief officers on duty, get one that works, get it out to me as quick as we can, please.
Dispatcher: 0038 Clear

Chief 1: Dispatcher to Incident Command
Dispatcher: Clear
Chief 1: OK, Central Chief is on his way to 11's to pick up that explosive meter, they'll be enroute to your location
Chief 1: That's clear
Dispatcher: 0045

Command to Dispatcher, can you give me the time that I indicated this fire was confined
Dispatcher: That time will be 0012
Thank you
Dispatcher: 052

Chief 1: Dispatcher to Incident Command
Dispatcher: Incident Command, go head
Chief 1: Have you got a mechanic there that you can release to go to Miami Valley Hospital, Medic 15 will not start
Chief 1: We got a mechanic running around here, we'll relay the message
Dispatcher: 134

Dispatch, this is Garage 4
Dispatcher: Go head
Chief 1: Ah, we're enroute to pick up some more diesel, you want us to swing by the Valley and check it out
Dispatcher: Yes sir you can do that, you going to go before you get the diesel?
Ah, yeah, we can stop by before we fill up
Dispatcher: 135

Chief 1: Dispatcher to Incident Command
Dispatcher: Command, go head
Chief 1: Do you have an urgent need for diesel fuel at the scene there
Dispatcher: I haven't been made aware of any
Chief 1: That's clear, 135'
Dispatcher: OK, Garage 4 continue on to the hospital the Valley
Ah, that's a roger, we're enroute right
Dispatcher: 135
Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
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Dispatcher to Medic 15
15's go head
Dispatcher: Garage 4 is enroute to your location at this time
Clear
136

Incident Command, Dispatcher, would you send us your
closest engine with an AP and we'll release one of your
staged engines, we've got some brush fires that we need
to deal with out here, we'll need a four wheel drive vehicle
Dispatcher: 156
Clear

Dispatcher: What do you actually have in staging at this time?
Chief 7: We have Engines 9, 11, 16, Truck 15 and Truck 16 and Engine 18
well release Engine 18
Dispatcher: That is clear
Dispatcher: Engine and AP 15 respond to the fire scene, that will be
3671 Dayton Park Drive
That's Engine and AP 15 respond to 3671 Dayton Park Drive
that's at the fire scene
OK, Engine 15 and AP 15 158 Coleman

Engine 18 Dispatcher, we're in service from the fire scene
enroute to quarters

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, can you tell me what we've got'
staffing our stations right now and where they're located
Dispatcher: Co. 2's we have Engine 10; Co. 4's we have Engine 110
and Medic 4; Co. 8's we have Engine 108; Co. 11's we have
Engine 111: and Truck 111; Co. 12's we have Huber Heights
Reserve and standby personnel; Truck 13 at 13's; Engine
13 at 13's; Engine 116, Truck 113 at Co. 14; Engine 118 at
Co. 15's; Engine and AP 17 at Co. 17's; Engine 18 enroute
to Co. 18's; Engine 2, Truck 102 at the fire scene at
115 Samuel; that's it for now.

Chief 1: Thank you, it looks like we're still in pretty good shape
Dispatcher: That's true, and we do have a chief for each district
at this time
Chief 1: Thank you
206

Engine 15's on the fire scene
214

Investigator 1 Dispatcher, all investigators have been
released from the fire scene
217
Clear

Investigator I Dispatcher, when Investigator 6 clears the
scene on Samuel would you inform him that you can send him home
Dispatcher: That's clear, Investigator 6 are you clear on that message
Dispatcher to Investigator 6

Investigator 6 clear of Samuel, and out to the fire scene

Dispatcher:

Investigator 6 clear of Samuel, and out to the fire scene
Ah, per Investigator 1, you are released to go home
OK, Investigator 6 is clear, thank you

Investigator 7 I’ll be off the air
Investigator 6 off the air

Chief 1:

Incident Command to Dispatcher, I’m going to be releasing
Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 15, Truck 16, and Truck 2 and
you can release all day-off personnel when they go in service

Dispatcher:

That's clear, 257.

Chief 1:

For all intensive purposes, this fire will continue to burn
throughout the night into the morning, part of the day
tomorrow I guess, we’re going to continue to let this burn
and the companies that are on scene will be evaluated
as to what will be kept and released when I shift command
over

Dispatcher:

257
Clear

Truck 16's in service from the fire scene
302
Truck 16 clear

Truck 2's in service from the fire scene
303
Truck 2 clear

Paramedic 2 in-service
303
Paramedic 2 clear

Truck 15 in service leaving the fire scene
303
15 clear

Engine 9's in service
303
Clear
Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, command of this incident is being transferred to Chief 3, Chief 1 will be in service, these crews, again, will be here most of the night, in fact, all night.

Dispatcher: 304

(Tape Transcription Ended from Dispatcher Log Tape)
By Jim Babcock
STAFF WRITER

For Sierra Club leader Joe Bockelman, the fire-leveled Sherwin-Williams Automotive Distribution Center had long been “a problem waiting to be an accident.”

For Dayton City Commissioner Mark Henry, the raging, chemical-fed conflagration at the paint warehouse was “an environmental nightmare come true.”

What worried both men and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency as well, was the building’s proximity to Dayton’s 830-acre Miami River Well Field.

“The whole situation out there is one that never should have happened,” Bockelman, who is vice chair of the local Tecumseh Group of the Sierra Club, said Thursday.

“I would point to that as an example that well fields and industrial parks are two beasts that do not belong together - especially where the geologic setting affords no protection to our ground water.”

The charred, still-smoldering remains of the Sherwin-Williams warehouse are near the center of an 84-acre site known as the Coocourse 70/75 Industrial Park.

The city-owned site was opened to industrial development in 1973, and at one time was envisioned as the core of an industrial park that would spread over much of the Miami well field - which presently is occupied by the Kittyhawk Golf Course, a system of city water department recharge lagoons and a water-treatment plant and pumping station.

“But the way that City Hall weighed the policy options then, I guess, was a little different than we probably would now,” said Henry, who was elected to the City Commission in 1983.

“It would be my position now that that site wouldn’t be used for any other Industry - unless they want to propose a cotton-candy warehouse or something like that.”

The city changed its mind about expanding Concourse park in 1983, after a Florida consulting firm warned that further development would greatly increase “risks in destroying the water resource” underlying the site and the adjacent well field.

The consultant, CH2M Hill, also warned that “a significant potential hazard” already existed at five of about 29 structures on the site. And the company recommended a series of steps to prevent the release of hazardous substances - including keeping
CONTINUED FROM/1

out "prospective tenants which use or have as a byproduct... any material listed or classified as hazardous."

The CH2M Hill recommendations led to a June 22, 1983, City Commission resolution promising that Concourse park would not be expanded and that all future development with the park would be carefully screened to assure that it posed minimum potential for contaminating ground water.

But that step failed to satisfy the Ohio EPA, which had specifically cited the Sherwin-Williams warehouse as a high risk in an October 1980 letter asking the city to take steps to minimize the potential for ground water contamination from chemical spills.

The letter noted that the warehouse contained an estimated 1.5 million gallons of paint and paint solvents that could cause extensive contamination if they were accidentally spilled.

Ironically, city and Sherwin-Williams officials agreed that a "major fire" at the warehouse could pose the greatest hazard if paints and solvents were carried onto the wellfield with water from firefighters hoses.

But the officials also said fire was a remote possibility, because the warehouse was equipped with an automatic sprinkler system. And the Sherwin-Williams spokesman surmised that if there were a fire, most of the chemicals would be consumed by flames.

Fire officials said Thursday, though, that the fire was so intense because of these chemicals that it overwhelmed the sprinkler system.

After speaking out in 1980, the Ohio EPA did not again make its concerns public until early 1983, when it criticized the city for permitting another Concourse tenant, Purolator Courier, to bury two 12,000-gallon fuel tanks at the company's new location in the park.

Then in 1984 -- after traces of cancer-causing industrial degreasing solvents were detected in several wells near the north end of Kittyhawk Golf Course -- the state agency began intensified negotiating the led to an agreement committing the city to refrain from developing any remaining vacant parcels in the industrial park.

The January 1985 agreement also committed the city to development of a well field protection and management plan and to requiring Concourse's existing tenants to establish safeguards to prevent chemical and fuel spills from escaping to areas where they could seep into ground water.

"Henry said he feels the agreement has helped establish "an uneasy middle ground."

"The tough question we all reach at some point in time is what do we do about business development that already exists in environmentally sensitive areas? ...You make it as safe as possible. You take all the steps you can take and put in safeguards so that if things do happen, you don't get hurt as bad," Henry said.

Henry also said the Sherwin-Williams warehouse "was the greatest concern" because of the sheer quantity of the contaminants they handled.

But he surmised that safeguards already installed in the warehouse may have helped contain unburned chemicals.

"For example, a concrete apron they were required to extend probably helped keep runoff from spreading," he said.

Bockelman saw the situation differently, however. The Sierra Club officials charged that the city has been slow in implementing the wellfield protection steps called for by the agreement.

"The city has been playing the game too long -- kind of toying with the risks," he said.

"They should have tried to relocate Sherwin-Williams right away. It just flies in the face of modern environmental protection... These water problems we're facing are just textbook illustrations of what government is supposed to prevent."

Bockelman also said his criticisms of Dayton's wellfield protection efforts extend as well to the city's Mad River Well-Field, which stretches between Finley Street and Rohrer's Island in East Dayton.

"I guess this has brought us to the point where we feel we've got to abandon the (Concourse) industrial park. The water is just too delicate a resource to jeopardize with facilities such as Sherwin-Williams. And if that's true, we must abandon Gateway (Industrial Park, near the Mad River field) as well."

"But we've committed millions of dollars," Henry said. "and the city is trying to implement one of the most progressive water management plans in the country."