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Executive
Summary
Incendiary
and suspicious fires in structures decreased 3% in 1998 to the lowest
total in the 22 years studied. Incendiary and suspicious causes remain
the #1 cause of property damage due to fire in the U.S.A. In 1998, for
the fourth straight year, juvenile firesetters accounted for half or more
of those arrested for arson. Their share in 1998 was 52% of all arrests.
The number
of incendiary and suspicious structure fires fell to 76,000 in 1998. The
death toll in these structure fires rose slightly to 470, still the second
lowest figure in the 22 years studied. Incendiary and suspicious vehicle
fires fell very slightly to 45,000. Direct property damage to structures
and vehicles caused by incendiary and suspicious fires totaled $1.249
billion in 1998, a decrease of 5%.
When outdoor
fires and a proportional share of fires with unknown causes are added,
losses to arson or suspected arson typically total around $2 billion,
or roughly one of every four dollars lost to fire in a typical year. The
total number of incendiary and suspicious fires with this allocation of
a share of unknown-cause fires is typically half a million, two-thirds
of them outdoor trash or grass fires. Both 1997 figures were below these
typical levels.
The NFPA
has estimated the number of incendiary and suspicious structure fires
since 1977, and in 16 of the 21 years since then, the number has fallen
or stayed the same, for a cumulative drop of 55%. Direct losses in those
fires have risen but by less than the rate of inflation, and the cumulative
drop after adjusting for inflation has been 54%. However, most of the
decline in fires and losses occurred prior to 1984, and the trend in inflation-adjusted
losses was upward from 1990 to 1993, driven by large-loss fires. In 1994
to 1998, the only comparable incident was in 1995, so the trend through
1998 ended with a large decrease.
Preliminary
results of a special study indicate a substantial link between arson
and illegal
drug activity, on the order of one-fifth to one-fourth (20-25%) of reported
arson cases in affected cities. Confirmed incendiary fires account for
one-third of the total arson problem, and since part of the use of arson
as a weapon is intimidation, which requires an awareness by a victim that
he is the target of a hostile act, it is unlikely that fires reported
as suspicious or unknown cause show as great a link to illegal drug activity.
Drug activity may be linked to some suspicious fires, but this may be
offset by a reduced link between drug activity and arson in communities
smaller than the cities studied. Therefore, the overall percentage of
set fires linked to illegal drug activity would be estimated as one-third
of 20-25%, or 7-8% of the estimated incendiary or suspicious fires in
those cities. This is a small fraction but a large enough number of fires
(thousands to tens of thousands) to justify special attention.
Arson receives
more attention and publicity than any other type of fire, and perhaps
for that reason, it has developed a number of persistent myths. One is
that arson is the fastest-growing crime in the U.S. Since it is not growing,
this is far from true. A second is that arson is hard to solve because
it destroys all the evidence. In fact, arson cases are as likely to be
solved as any other property crime, and most arson fires do not grow large
enough to destroy all evidence. A third is that there is a link between
arson and trends in the economy, particularly recessions. In hard times,
it is not unusual for local fire officials and insurance adjusters in
some communities to report apparent jumps in some types of arson. The
national statistics, however, do not show evidence of a significant link,
and some other motives are consistently found, in special studies, to
account for larger shares of arson than arson-for-profit.
Statistics
compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the Uniform Crime
Reports show that in 1998 juveniles (under age 18) accounted for 52% of
all arson arrests and 45% of all arson offenses solved by arrest, both
historically high values. No other FBI index crime (the most serious felonies)
has so high a rate of juvenile involvement.
The percentage
of 1998 arson arrestees under age ten – 5.7% - was by far the highest
for any crime the FBI tracks, whether major or minor. One-third of all
1998 arson arrestees (34.6%) were under age 15. Progress in reducing arson
clearly requires more widespread use of juvenile firesetter counseling
and related fire prevention education programs. Their success, in turn,
depends upon a recognition of the different types of juvenile firesetters
and the extent to which the degree of emotional disturbances is often
correlated with the age of the perpetrator. (Note that fires due to fireplay
- fires set by children too young to understand the consequences of their
actions - are not included in arson statistics.) A typology of juvenile
firesetters, such as the one used by the U.S. Fire Administration, is
essential to an effective matching of counseling program with juvenile
firesetter.
Only 16%
of 1998 arson offenses were solved by arrest, according to FBI statistics,
which was typical for property crimes.
By combining
NFPA analysis of fire causes with a series of U.S. Department of Justice
(DoJ) special studies of the criminal justice system, it is possible to
estimate that only about 2% of set fires lead to convictions. Of all the
incendiary, suspicious, and unknown-cause fires that the NFPA estimates
are set fires, only one-third are confirmed as incendiary which must happen
for the police to consider them as arson offenses. Of those, 80-85% are
never solved. Of those that are solved by arrest, about half of the suspects
are never prosecuted. And about one-third of those prosecuted are not
convicted. Put these together, and the result is only 2% of set fires
lead to convictions.
Other DoJ
studies suggest that about one-third of those convicted receive no jail
or prison time and most who are convicted get less than two years. Once
released, more than half who were imprisoned will be rearrested (not necessarily
for arson) within three years.
These statistics
point to areas of potential improvement throughout the process, but the
greatest leverage by far would be achieved in the earliest stages of confirming
fires as set and solving arson crimes, both of which require more investigative
resources, including training, for fire and police departments. And the
large role of children and of adults who are emotionally disturbed shows
that most arsons are not set by people sophisticated about fire, and many
are cries for help that might be deflected to other channels if fire-setting
were made more difficult. Arson may be reduced, for example, by increased
security, reduced access to attractive sites, and removal of attractive
fuel sources, like trash.
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